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INTRODUCTION

On September 4th, 2014, Officer Sean Groubert of the South
Carolina State Police pulled his police cruiser behind the vehicle
driven by Levar Jones at a gas station in South Carolina. Officer
Jones would later state the reason he pulled behind Jones was
because he observed Jones was not wearing his seat belt. Jones would
later state he removed his seat belt upon pulling into the gas station
to exit his vehicle and enter the station. All of the following events
were captured by the dash-cam in Officer Groubert’s car.1
Levar Jones exited his vehicle and, with his car door still
open, noticed the police vehicle behind him. His face exhibited
surprise and confusion. 2 Officer Groubert requested Jones’ license in
a controlled speaking voice. 3 Jones pats his pocket, and realizing his
wallet is not there, does a rapid shoulder shift from facing Groubert
to facing the inside of his vehicle.4 He then leans into the vehicle as
an ordinary place to secure his wallet, which he had left sitting on the
front seat.5 However, Officer Groubert (apparently) viewed the rapid
shoulder shift as an aggressive and hostile act. In the next three
seconds of film, he shouts “Get out of the Car!” twice, runs to cover
behind Jones’ vehicle and fires four shouts at Jones. 6 The first shot
hits Jones while he is turning around with the wallet in his hand. He
drops the wallet and backs away from the officer while putting his
hands up while three more shots hit him. In the same dash-cam
video, Groubert later describes the events to his supervisor.7
Groubert describes Jones’ surprise and confusion as an act of
“staring him down”; Jones’ leaning into his vehicle to secure his
This video can be found in many places on the internet. The one we will
reference is available at: The State Newspaper, Sept 4 Groubert traffic stop, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RBUUO_VFYMs.
2 Id. at time stamp :40.
3 Id. at time stamp :42.
4 Id. at time stamp :43 - :44.
5 Id. at time stamp :45.
6 Id. at time stamp :46 - :49.
7 This longer video can be found at: Tony Santaella and Steven Dial, Trooper
on Shooting: ‘He Kept Coming Towards Me’, WLTX19 (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.wltx.com/story/news/local/2014/09/26/sean-groubert-gives-hisaccount-of-shooting-levar-jones/16295527/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
1
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wallet as an act of “diving into his vehicle”; Jones’ acts of walking
backwards while putting his hands up as “he kept coming at me”; and
Jones’ wallet as a perceived weapon.8
On the one hand we could assume these to be self-serving
and dishonest statements by Officer Groubert. This assumption is
not necessary and it is far more probative to view them as the honest
(mis)perception of a shooter in a perceived hostile environment.
Under that lens, Groubert’s statements reflect a perception of an
African American male as a potential hostile in an asymmetric
battlefield-like environment,9 and give a rare insight into a shooter’s
psyche – a rapid, stress-filled situation.
The landscape of modern asymmetric conflicts, such as the
war in Afghanistan, is also murky. The Soldier, like the police officer,
is burdened with the reality that he does not know who the bad guy is
and who the innocent is. But the rules governing the Soldier are
starkly different than those governing the police officer for sound
and logical reasons. In a New York Times editorial, U.S. Marine Corps
Captain Timothy Kudo discusses his own use of force in
Afghanistan.10 While a commander, he was asked permission by his
Marines to kill two Afghans: “The voice on the other end of the
radio said: ‘There are two people digging by the side of the road. Can
we shoot them?’” The presumption is the two were implanting an
improvised explosion device – known as an IED – to kill or injure
Afghan or coalition Soldiers. Captain Kudo gave permission and the
two diggers were killed.11 There was an ever-present possibility the
diggers were merely irrigating their farm land and not sowing seeds of
violence toward Captain Kudo, his Marines, and the Afghan State.

Id.
The attitude of police in the United States towards African American
males has been the subject of much commentary and literature and is not the
subject of this piece. We mention it as a basis of comparison to the view of Soldiers
towards potential threats in the modern asymmetric battlefield.
10 Timothy Kudo, Editorial, How We Learned to Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2015, New York Edition at SR1.
11 Id.
8
9
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How we assess the use of force and whether force is
appropriate in any given situation is instrumental to how we function
as a deliberative democracy. While we might all agree Officer
Groubert’s actions are reprehensible and probably criminal, Captain
Kudo’s are less open to clear judgment. Should the judgment depend
on whether Captain Kudo was ultimately correct; that is, the diggers
were, in fact, bad guys, rather than innocent farmers making a living?
If Levar Jones had held up a gun rather than a wallet upon exiting his
vehicle, the authorities would probably have viewed Officer
Groubert’s actions differently. But the true (rather than perceived)
battlefield is a significantly different legal reality where far greater
uses of force have been permitted, including knowingly causing the
death of innocents.12 Evaluating Captain Kudo’s actions is made
problematic by the blending of warfighting with peacekeeping and
even battlefield law enforcement mandated by asymmetric warfare.
Among the volumes written on when force can be exercised
by Soldiers during armed conflict in the name of the State, the trend
over the last century has been to curtail a Soldier’s use of force and
rightfully so. The adoption by virtually every State13 of The Hague
Conventions in 1907,14 the Geneva Conventions 15 in the wake of
World War II, along with their Protocols in 1977,16 has been with a
Under the concept of proportionality, lawful combatants can knowingly
cause the incidental death of innocent noncombatants if the military advantage
gained exceeds their loss. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
13 The International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter “ICRC”] tracks
the current signatories to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
at
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/genevaconventions (The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by every
member state of the United Nations).
14 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat.
2277, October 18, 1907.
15 Jean S. Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45
AM. J. INT’L. L. 462 (1951).
16 Additional
Protocol I and Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter “Additional Protocol II”].
12
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singular purpose: to limit the devastation inflicted by armed conflict.
Armed conflict, however, persists. Whether it is the war in
Afghanistan or the crisis in the Ukraine, bloodshed of both innocent
civilians and lawful combatants/privileged belligerents 17 is a
persistent reality. In the modern era, complicating the calculus of
how to limit the destruction of war, many of these armed conflicts
are fueled by actors who refuse to wear military uniforms, carry their
arms openly, and become privileged belligerents; these actors lurk
amongst civilians and never show their true intent until they strike.
In the last decade, the trajectory of some courts, academics,
and even military leaders of States18 is to limit the force States’
militaries can use during conflict. The intent of these limits on what
force, including lethal force, militaries can use to accomplish the
mission is quite noble. The logic is the less force used by a Soldier,
the less death and destruction inflicted upon innocents. However,
these limitations are tainted by misunderstandings and mistakes
concerning the principles and goals of the Just War Theory,
particularly in the evaluation of battlefield conduct: jus in bello.
Academics and jurists have extrapolated familiar concepts
from criminal law jurisprudence, those used to evaluate Officer
Groubert’s conduct, such as intent, necessity, and proportionality,
and attempted to apply them to evaluate the acts of the privileged
belligerent. 19 The attempt to make the dissimilar into the similar is
understandable because man habitually tries to characterize the
unfamiliar by extrapolating from a familiar paradigm. However, while
the same terms may be used,20 the meaning of those terms differ

“The term “privileged belligerent” means an individual belonging to one
of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(6).
18 Examples of each are discussed later in this chapter.
19 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING
HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
2008) [hereinafter “Defending Humanity”] for an extrapolation of criminal law
concepts to jus ad bellum, an extrapolation that makes much more sense than to jus
in bello.
20 Both the criminal law and the jus in bello paradigms include common
terms such as self-defense and necessity, but the meanings can vary significantly.
17
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significantly between law enforcement and war. 21 This extrapolation
manifests itself in applying human rights law norms and the universal
reach of an individual’s right to life. Criminal law exists to preserve
the peace, whereas jus in bello works to end conflict.22
Exacerbating the problem is the other half of the Just War
Theory, jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum is a set of international principles
regulating when the State can initiate armed conflict. Extrapolating
criminal law jurisprudence to evaluate jus ad bellum actions is rational
because the goals and core concepts of the two paradigms are nearly
identical:23 In both systems, the “citizens” (individuals in criminal law,
States in jus ad bellum) lose the ability to use violence to achieve their
aims except in rare circumstances where the violence is legally
authorized (law enforcement and U.N. Security Council Resolution)
or justified (self-defense of the individual and the state). Further,
both share a common fundamental goal: preserving the peace.
Therefore, using criminal law concepts and jurisprudence to evaluate
jus ad bellum action, as proposed by George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin in
Defending Humanity, is proper.24 The reason: the words and meaning are
the same. What is not defensible, morally or legally, is using this
similarity as a gateway to then apply criminal law concepts to jus in
bello where these substantive and goal similarities do not exist. The
words may be the same, but the meaning is different.

21 A good example of this divergence is the concept of self-defense. In the
criminal law paradigm, the individual’s right of self-defense is limited by, among
other things, the responsibility to not cause the death of anyone but the aggressor,
and the ability to use force in self-defense is limited to the timeframe of the
aggression. In contrast, on the battlefield, a lawful combatant can knowingly cause
the death of an innocent in self-defense, provided the death is incidental and that it
is exceeded by the military advantage of staying alive. Further, the lawful combatant
can engage in status rather than conduct based self-defense.
22 “The object of war has been understood to be the submission of the
enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible.” The Department of DOD LAW OF
WAR MANUAL, June 2015, [hereinafter “DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL”] paragraph
1.4.1 citing 1940 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶22 (“The object of war is to
bring about the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of
regulated violence.”); 1914 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶10 (same).
23 Id.
24 Id.

117

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

This extrapolation of criminal law concepts to the battlefield
is not defensible because in armed conflict a commander’s calculus
revolves around military necessity--defined as “the necessity of those
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war,
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of
war.”25 The commander must balance, on one hand, the necessary
precautions to protect civilians with, on the other hand, the
commander’s conclusion of military necessity. Imbedded in this
conclusion is military judgment. This concept simply does not exist in
domestic criminal law. And with any judgment, especially one which
stems from whether necessary precautions were taken in light of the
military action in the name of military necessity, there is the element
of subjectivity. The modern trend has been to extend “the domestic
law of negligence to the battle zone – where civilian norms of duty of
care” are applied to military decisions.26 This means civilian criminal
standards are being applied to decisions made in war. The
manifestation of this trend is to focus on the results of the military
decision after the fact (e.g., were civilians killed?), rather than focus on
the rationale of the military act under current International
Humanitarian Law (IHL).27
Conflating civilian criminal standards with the rationale of a
military act under IHL comes at a high cost for democratic armies
and has, in these authors’ opinion, not been fully debated. The
biggest cost is to the effectiveness of a State’s military to bring an end
to armed conflict. Efforts to protect the enemy belligerent and
innocent civilians by limiting the Soldier’s lethality acts to defeat a
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.2.1 citing, among multiple
other sources, General Order No. 100, the Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, commonly known as the Lieber Code art.
14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”).
26 Thomas Tugendhat & Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the
Legal Erosion of British Fighting Power, Policy Exchange (2013) at 11,
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
27 International Humanitarian Law is synonymous with the Law of War and
the Law of Armed Conflict. This body of international law regulates the conduct of
forces when engaged in war and armed conflict.
25
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fundamental goal of jus in bello, bringing about an end to the war;
therefore causing an increase, rather than decrease, of violence.
Unrealistic limitations on the Soldier means there are rules he
can never overcome. If the acid test is to kill no civilians, for
example, then closing with and killing or capturing an amorphous
enemy who looks and acts like a civilian is profoundly difficult, if not
impossible. Placing limitations on the Soldier limits their ability to
exercise the principle of military necessity and, therefore, defeats one
of the core principles of the Just War Theory.
This article will argue the right of the Soldier to engage and
destroy military objectives is inherent to warfare; efforts to stem or
limit this force need to be fully understood and carefully considered
within jus in bello instead of the criminal law paradigm. Failure to do
so may actually increase violence rather than decrease it, as well as
violate the State’s sacred obligation to its designated belligerents:
Soldiers.
Even though the Soldier is legally and morally blameless for
his presence on the battlefield, he loses the protections of the civilian
criminal law against violence. In exchange for this sacrifice, the
Soldier gains the right to use violence to execute the mission and
bring about an end to the war. Forcing the Soldier to waive his right
to the protections of the law while simultaneously denying him the
ability to effectively accomplish his mission reduces him to nothing
more than a designated target for those who oppose his State.
This article will start with a brief introduction to the core
principles of the Just War Theory and use these to identify its
fundamental goals. This section will examine the differences between
privileged belligerents and civilians and highlight why the rights of
privileged belligerents cannot tether to the concepts or goals of
domestic criminal law. The second part of the article will then
examine five specific trends which are part and parcel to the
pervasive wave against the use of force and the actual or potential
cost to how Soldiers behave in conflict; that is, jus in bello. The
authors will ultimately conclude that until war itself is fully eliminated
from the human experience, the lex specialis of jus in bello within the
Just War Theory is pragmatically justified and a morally mandated
119

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

duty of the international community of States to privileged
belligerents.
II.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE JUST WAR THEORY AND A
COMPARISON TO TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

The Just War Theory has traditionally 28 been divided into the
morality of a State or group’s decision to engage in armed conflict, jus
ad bellum, and the manner in which armed conflict is conducted, jus in
bello.29
Jus ad bellum has evolved from the right of states to use war to
achieve political ends, enforce treaties, and in reprisal, to the far more
restrictive modern approach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, which requires States to “…refrain from the threat or use of
force against .. any state” in order to “…maintain international peace
and security.”30 The only commonly recognized exceptions to this
prohibition are the use of force authorized by the Security Council 31
and the use of force in self-defense under Article 5132 of the same
charter. In this regard, jus ad bellum mirrors the paradigm of civilian
criminal law in both goal (preserving peace) and substance (the
Modern academics have posited a third area of concern within the Just
War Theory, that of jus post bellum, or the responsibility of belligerent states after the
conclusion of armed conflict.
29 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (Basic Books, 3RD ed. 2000) [hereinafter
“Walzer”]: “War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states
have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind
of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust.
The second is adverbial: we say that a war is being fought justly or unjustly.”
30 Charter of the United Nations, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 article 2(4)
[hereinafter “UN Charter”].
31 Id. at article 24(2) “The specific powers granted to the Security Council
for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.”
These powers include the ability to use force for Chapter VI peacekeeping, or
Chapter VII peace enforcement.
32 Id. at article 51 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
28
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individual’s ability to use force is limited to situations justified by an
external imminent threat).
A. The Uniqueness of Jus in bello
Unlike jus ad bellum, which evolved almost entirely based on
international agreement,33 jus in bello is primarily the product of
custom. Modern treaties, such as the four Geneva Conventions and
its Protocols, have acted to codify rules evolved from core principles
developed by the practice of professional warfighters over centuries.34
These principles include Distinction, Military Necessity, and
Proportionality.
1. The Principle of Distinction.35
Any analysis of jus in bello should begin with the principle of
distinction, because it is the springing condition for the lex specialis.
Said another way, without the application of the principle of
distinction, the substance of traditional criminal law is an entirely
adequate tool to determine the legality of a given act. The principle
subdivides into: A) the responsibility of combatants to distinguish
themselves from civilians; and B) the responsibility to target only
enemy combatants and military objectives with attacks.36

33 Prior to its conclusion in the U.N. Charter, the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremburg identified the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 as a source of
restrictions on the power of jus ad bellumjus ad bellum for signees.
34 The Lieber Code is often cited as the first documentation of the modern
laws of war. This code was not a creative work, but rather the result of Francis
Lieber working on a committee of military professionals to codify existing
customary practice that had been developed over centuries.
35 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.5.
36 Id.
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(i) The Responsibility of Combatants to Distinguish Themselves from
Civilians.
International law grants combatants the legal and moral
authority to commit violent acts that would otherwise be abhorrent
and punishable under traditional criminal law.37 This privileged
belligerency allows them to shoot and kill enemy Soldiers based on
their mere status as members of the enemy military force.38 Criminal
law would only allow this attack if properly imposing a death
sentence on the victim39 or if the victim was posing an imminent
threat to the shooter (or another) and the shot was a proportional
response to that threat40 (e.g., without a current imminent threat,
Officer Groubert could not shoot Levar Jones even if Jones was the
worst criminal in history).
Further, except in the case of a death sentence and in
preventing the escape of an individual who poses a significant threat
of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others, 41 law
enforcement officers have no greater privilege to use deadly force
than an ordinary citizen. The privileged belligerent does not suffer
any of these limitations. She can kill her victim while he sleeps from
one thousand miles away, facing no imminent threat whatsoever.42
For this privileged belligerent to gain this legal authority to target and
do violence to others, however, she must first set herself out as a
37 The specific language used denotes privileged belligerency as a ‘right.’
“Members of the armed forces…have a right to participate directly in hostilities.”
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43(2).
38 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocol I 1453 (¶4789) “Those
who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.”
39 In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) the United States Supreme
Court overturned its decision of four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), and held that capital punishment was a lawful use of force and not
prohibited by the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
40 Model Penal Code [MPC] §3.04 “…the use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such other person.” & 3.05 “…the use of force upon or toward the person of
another is justifiable to protect a third person when…the actor would be justified
under Section 3.04 in using such force to protect himself.”
41 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
42 Tugendhat & Croft, supra note 26.
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lawful target,43 such that she can also legally be killed while sleeping
by an enemy she has never met, let alone threatened. Combatants
that distinguish themselves from civilians are the only individuals
authorized to commit these violent acts of war authorized by jus in
bello; 44 all others must comply with the mandates of criminal law.
(ii) The Responsibility to Target only Enemy Combatants and Military
Objectives.
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the restriction to limit
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives applies only to
combatants – privileged belligerents. This does not mean civilians –
noncombatants – can target other civilians at will. It means if they are
not a combatant, a civilian cannot target anyone, except when their
conduct would be justified by traditional criminal law. Only the
privileged belligerent can step outside the constraints of traditional
criminal law, but when they do so, they must limit the targets of their
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives.45
B. The Principle of Military Necessity46
In addition to the principle of distinction, the concept of
privileged belligerency is inextricably linked to a second principle of
jus in bello, military necessity. Distinction clarifies what one must do to
qualify for the privilege, and military necessity identifies what violent
powers one is granted. In simplest terms, the principle of military
necessity authorizes the combatant to do acts of violence against the
enemy military that are needed to bring about the complete
submission of that enemy and an end to the war.47 Once again,
43 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva,
12 August 1949 [hereinafter “Geneva III”] at Art. 4.
44 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, paragraph 5.5.8.
45 It is this second part of the Principle of Distinction that prohibits
indiscriminate attacks. Thus, it is often referred to as the Principle of
Discrimination. The authors view this as a subset of Distinction rather than a
separate Principle.
46 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25.
47 Id.
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however, this does not apply to civilians or civilian law enforcement.
Officer Groubert may have the mission to apprehend a violent felon,
but without probable cause of a significant threat to the officer or
others, he is authorized to only use ordinary force to make an arrest.48
The principle of military necessity has both a permissive and a
restrictive aspect, as well as providing the lawful combatant a moral
foundation for his acts of violence.
1. The Privilege of Strategic Justification for Acts of Violence.
A civilian is authorized to do limited violence to rebuff an
imminent threat. A civilian must justify each act of violence based on
contemporaneous and proximate danger to themselves or others. 49
For the combatant, eliminating a threat to themselves is merely
ancillary to their duty to win the war as rapidly as possible. Therefore,
a combatant’s acts must be evaluated in the much broader context of
how they affect the war effort and not just the narrow frame of time
and place the act occurred. A combatant can blow up a bridge built
by farmers to get to their fields, not because of any threat posed by
those farmers, but because she has reason to believe the enemy plans
to use the bridge to transport troops across the river two weeks in
the future.
2. The Restrictive Side of Military Necessity.
This principle is both permissive, allowing the combatant to
do all acts necessary to win the war, and restrictive, prohibiting
violent acts which would otherwise be lawful, if they are not needed
for victory. On the restrictive side is the prohibition against attacks
that cause unnecessary suffering.50 Putting glass shrapnel in a grenade
so subsequent surgery will be more difficult is an example of violence

See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. (This is the rule of Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (1985)).
49 MPC §3.04 & 3.05.
50 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 70.
48
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that goes beyond the principle of necessity.51 A second part of the
restrictive side of military necessity (as well as the discrimination
aspect of distinction) is the concept of humane treatment.52 Once
Soldiers become hors de combat by being injured, surrendering, or
evacuating a sinking boat or crashing plane, they are no longer lawful
targets. Further, the capturing party has a plethora of responsibilities
for their welfare.53
3. The Combatant’s Raison d’Etre.
Perhaps the most important aspect of military necessity is
that it is inextricably linked to bringing about an end to hostilities.
The lawful combatant is not a mercenary performing a service for a
fee. Instead, she is the designated agent of the State sent to engage in
and be the target of horrific violence. The lawful combatant loses the
protections of the law and in exchange is offered immunity for their
acts of combat. The moral individual would never stomach this loss
merely so they can do greater acts of violence against strangers. They
sacrifice, sometimes involuntarily,54 the protections of the law for the
higher purpose of bringing about an end to the armed conflict
through victory over the enemy. The principle of military necessity
protects their ability to achieve victory and thus provides the
foundational explanation for the very existence of the military.

Unnecessary Suffering is often cited as a separate Principle of jus in bello,
but since it is merely the negative corollary of Military Necessity (One can do only
that violence which is necessary, so causing suffering that is not is prohibited) we
prefer to view it as a subset.
52 Humanity or Humane Treatment is also often viewed as a totally separate
Principle, but the authors view it as a subset of both Military Necessity and
Distinction since its fundamental principles are again a limitation on unnecessary
violence against noncombatants and the suffering thereof.
53 Geneva III, supra note 43.
54 The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (1917) required
registration for a draft, or the governmental act of forcing an individual into the
military.
51
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C. The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality requires the anticipated result
of any attack to bring about a military advantage exceeding the
collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. 55 Like military
necessity, this principle is both permissive and restrictive.
As noted above, the lawful purpose of a combatant’s acts of
war is not to secure their personal safety, but to bring about the end
of the conflict. The latter is much more difficult to achieve as well as
significantly more important to the international community. As
such, the combatants have been granted far greater leniency than
civilians when the effects of their violent acts are legally analyzed. If a
civilian knowingly brings about the death of a non-aggressing person,
this is considered intentional homicide even if the actor did not desire
death to occur.56 If Officer Groubert, while chasing a group of
fleeing violent felons, knowingly drives his vehicle over and kills a
bystander civilian to avoid losing his targets, this is murder regardless
of his benevolent motive to stop the violent felons from escaping. 57
However, if a combatant blows up the enemy commander’s car,
purposefully killing him and knowingly killing his three-year-old
daughter who is riding with him, the attack would be perfectly legal
under jus in bello if the concrete military advantage gained by the
commander’s death outweighed the death of the innocent girl. As
noted in the discussion of the principle of distinction, above, the
combatant could never target the little girl, but under the principle of
proportionality, her collateral death could be legally acceptable under
jus in bello. Like military necessity, this concept of legally acceptable
collateral damage is limited to the privileged belligerent. The civilian
is not authorized to attack the enemy commander even if the girl is
not present.

55
56
57

Additional Protocol I, art. 52.
MPC §210.2.
Id.
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1. The Goals of the Just War Theory.
The two sides of the Just War Theory, jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, have significantly different, though sequential and convergent
goals. Both strive to limit the costs of armed conflict. The former
attempts to achieve this by the singular goal of preventing the
occurrence and existence of armed conflict. If jus ad bellum fails and
armed conflict begins, it falls to jus in bello to limit the violence
through three goals: ending the conflict, limiting the cost to lawful
combatants, and limiting the violence done to noncombatants.
The goal of jus ad bellum is overt – to maintain international
peace and security by preventing armed conflict. 58 This parallels the
civilian government’s law enforcement mission of maintaining peace
and security by preventing violent (and nonviolent) crime.
The goals of jus in bello, though less obvious, can be gleaned
from the three core principles discussed above. When viewed
together, the requirement to distinguish oneself under the principle
of distinction, the ability to do violence strategically motivated under
military necessity, and the increased lenience towards collateral
damage encapsulated within proportionality, coalesce into the
purpose of bringing about a rapid end to the armed conflict. The
concepts of privileged belligerency and humane treatment combine
to evince a second purpose – limiting the cost of war paid by its
participants. A third purpose, shown by the requirement of
discrimination, is to limit the cost of war paid by the innocent
civilian.
Each of these is a noble and laudable purpose integral to the
Just War Theory. However, it appears that in the modern asymmetric
environment, some want to prioritize the third goal to the detriment
of the first two. Comments and decisions by leaders, academics, and
jurists who desire to prevent military violence, while laudable, reflect
a lack of appreciation of the first two purposes in the jus in bello
paradigm as well as the core legal concepts within this lex specialis.

58

Preamble to the UN Charter.
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2. The Required Gap Between Civilians and Privileged Belligerents
Under the Lex Specialis of Jus in bello.
The foundation of all jus in bello is the concept of privileged
belligerency. The legal gap between the privileged belligerent and the
civilian is arguably greater than any other that could be drawn
between two people. While the police officer may have more legal
authority to use some force than the citizen, it pales in relation to the
Soldier’s license to kill. The death-row convict may have forfeited his
fundamental right to life based on his prior acts, but he still stands
closer to the ordinary citizen than the Soldier whose life becomes
legally forfeit through no act of his own. 59 This gap is why the first
and most important question of evaluating the legality of any act of
combat is: was the actor a privileged belligerent?
If the answer to this antecedent question is no, there is no
need to look to the lex specialis of IHL to evaluate their conduct;
criminal law is fully capable of this adjudication. However, if the
answer is yes, the actor was a privileged belligerent, then criminal law
is irrelevant and only IHL should be used to evaluate their acts of
combat.60
If a person is unprivileged (i.e., a civilian), he is prohibited
from the use of violence against persons or property of another
except when that conduct is legally justified or excused and a
proportional response to an imminent threat. This prohibition is the
product of the comparatively consistent jurisprudence of criminal law
developed over millennia. In contrast, the privileged belligerent (i.e.,
the Soldier) is permitted to use violence to destroy property and kill
people. Further, these acts of violence can be grossly disproportional
to a threat that is distant in both time and place. For example, a
privileged belligerent controlling a piece of field artillery in an armed
conflict can use the weapon to kill 1,000 enemy Soldiers 20 miles

As stated above, even involuntary membership in the armed forces makes
you a lawful target of the enemy privileged belligerent.
60 The legal maxim is “lex specialis derogat legi generali” so the lex specialis of
IHL takes precedence over the more general criminal law.
59
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away even if they are sitting down to dinner and have no plans to
attack him.61
For the civilian, the battlefield, in and of itself, does not grant
him any additional legal authority to use force. Legally, a citizen on
the battlefield operates under the same restrictions as one caught in a
gunfight between police and a group of bank robbers. The situation
may give rise to the legal ability to use violence based on justification
(self-defense) or excuse (necessity), but this will be factually
dependent and temporarily linked to the existence of a given
imminent threat.62
The Soldier goes through a dramatic legal conversion once
armed conflict begins. The Soldier morphs from a civilian legally
indistinguishable from any other concerning the use of force, to a
new type of legal entity authorized by the world community to use
deadly force. As noted above, the Soldier is even authorized to
knowingly kill innocent civilians, provided their deaths are
outweighed by the concrete military advantage gained.
Criminal law prohibits a civilian from using force or violence
except in narrow circumstances such as self-defense. Therefore, the
principles embedded in jus in bello – military necessity, proportionality,
and distinction – do not provide any additional legal guidance with
which to evaluate their acts. A civilian is not allowed to use violence
to achieve his goals, military or otherwise, so the principle of military
necessity never applies. A civilian is prohibited from knowingly or
recklessly causing the deaths of innocent civilians, or damage to their
property, so any argument that the loss was proportional to what he
hoped to gain will fall on deaf ears. Concerning distinction, a civilian
is not authorized to use unjustified violence against any target,

61 The concept of proportionality limit collateral damage to civilians and
civilian property, it does not limit damage to lawful targets. Members of the enemy
military are lawful targets at all times unless they become hors d’combat by
surrendering, being wounded to the point they can no longer fight, becoming
unconscious, entering the water after their warship is sunk, or parachuting from a
destroyed aircraft for safety.
62 MPC §3.
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whether it be military or civilian, so limiting his strikes to military
targets is legally insignificant.63
A Soldier can be killed on the battlefield, but she is immune
from prosecution or punishment for her lawful acts of combat, (i.e.,
as long as her battlefield acts do not violate jus in bello she cannot be
criminally judged even if her side loses the war). The rationale is
Soldiers have no control over if or when they will be sent to armed
conflict; therefore, it is patently unjust both to punish them for that
collective decision (jus ad bellum) and to use rules which are applicable
domestically (criminal law instead of jus in bello).
III.

PART II – CONFLATION & MISUNDERSTANDING ERRORS IN
THE TREND AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

The errors in the trend against the use of military force fall
into five general categories: 1) a conflation of jus in bello with jus ad
bellum; 2) a morphing of the military mission away from traditional
war-fighting responsibilities, thereby frustrating the jus in bello goals of
a rapid end to the conflict and limiting the cost to the warfighter; 3) a
conflation of jus in bello concepts with similar terms in the traditional
criminal law paradigm; 4) an attempt by some academics to revise
time-tested principles in IHL that are the product of centuries of
customary practice, and, 5) a general lack of military deference in
modern courts by jurists with no military experience or valid frame of
reference.
The costs of these errors are high: an ineffective military
prolongs armed conflict through impotence and indecision, and
victimizes the modern warfighter by leaving her outside the
protections of the law; denying her the higher purpose of ending the
armed conflict; and, reducing her to the legal peer of the criminals 64
she is forced to oppose.
Id.
This refers to the enemy combatants that disregard the principles of jus in
bello by failing to distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform and carrying arms
openly, among other violations. They can be labeled as criminals because they do
63
64
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A. Trend 1: the Jus ad bellum’s Veneer Over Jus ad bello
As already outlined and discussed throughout this article, jus
ad bellum and jus in bello are separable concepts. The public is
comfortable and familiar with evaluating the merits of a given side in
an armed conflict; it is a regular part of the political discourse and the
fundamentals of jus ad bellum are similar to the restrictions on the use
of force they face in everyday life. Public discourse is a good thing
and the decision to enter an armed conflict should be widely and
publicly debated. However, politicians, commentators, jurists, and
academics then allow this jus ad bellum decision to enter an armed
conflict to color and affect how they discuss and evaluate the legality
of the combatant’s acts in jus in bello. The conflation of jus ad bellum
and jus in bello is both legally and morally problematic.65 The two
concepts are distinct but can become blurred when the reasons
behind why a State entered an armed conflict are suspect or without
merit.
World War II is a perfect example to compare one State’s
Soldier with another: the German Soldier and his American
counterpart. The German Soldier was a product of an evil State. But
the rules governing the German Soldier in combat are identical to the
rules that govern the U.S. Soldier in combat. The validity of a jus ad
bellum claim that a war is unjust is totally irrelevant to the legality of a
given warlike act of a Soldier. As the Just War Theorist Professor
Michael Walzer notes, just wars can be fought unjustly and unjust
not possess privileged belligerency and therefore all of their acts of violence, to
include the killing of uniformed enemy, are subject to criminal prosecution.
65 This issue has been identified in the DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL:
“As a general matter, jus in bello and jus ad bellum address different legal issues
and should not be conflated. Conflating jus in bello and jus ad bellum risks
misunderstanding and misapplying these concepts. For example, in jus ad bellum,
proportionality refers to the principle that the overall goal of the State in resorting
to war should not be outweighed by the harm that the war is expected to produce.
However, proportionality in jus in bello generally refers to the standard that the
expected incidental harm to the civilian population and civilian objects should not
be disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage from an attack. Therefore,
although a jus ad bellum proportionality analysis might consider the harm suffered by
enemy military forces in the fighting, a jus in bello proportionality analysis would
not.” Id. at 3.5.1.
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wars can be fought justly.66 While politics are a necessary part of jus
ad bellum,67 we should be careful to keep politics from affecting any jus
in bello legal determinations and adjudication just like we try to keep
politics out of our domestic criminal law decisions.
This task is difficult enough without being linked to the
modern international criminal tribunal whose jurists do not share a
common polity with the defendant or even with each other. While
these same conditions existed at Nuremberg, many of those judges
were military officers fully aware that the decisions they made would
affect their profession. Conversely, few judges at the international
tribunals have any military experience.68 This lack of military
experience is evident in many of our politicians, commentators,
jurists, and academics; the result is that they tend to be far more
familiar with and accepting of the criminal law and jus ad bellum goals
of maintaining the peace rather than the jus in bello mission of rapidly
ending the war.
B. Trend 2: The Current Mindset for War: From the Management
of Violence to the Management of Governance
The role of the modern military is changing and today’s
militaries face great uncertainty. New technologies and capabilities to
inflict harm are not only held by States but are in the hands of nonState actors.69 In War From the Ground Up, Emily Simpson divides
modern conflict into two categories: war fought “to establish military

WALZER supra note 29, at 21.
For example, the Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution give the
power to declare war to the most political of the three branches of the Federal
Government: Congress.
68 For a discussion of the cost of a lack of military experience among
Tribunal judges, see Richard V. Meyer, Following Historical Precedent: An Argument for
the Continued Use of Military Professionals as Triers of Fact in Some Humanitarian Law
Tribunals, 7 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 43 (2009).
69 A byproduct of the post-industrial information age is that the raw
materials and the knowledge to manufacture or develop potent weapons are both
readily available to the general populace.
66
67
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conditions for a political solution;”70 and war fought to “directly seek
political, as opposed to military, outcomes.”71 The Gulf War from
1990 to 1991 is a modern example of the first type while Afghanistan
is an example of the second. The reality of having a strategy that
needs “to consider military actions in terms of their likely political
interpretations”72 will persist. As Simpson correctly notes, General
Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009, restricted the use of
both indirect fires and air-delivered bombs not because “they are . . .
effective in military terms; they are. However, their political effect is
often more harmful than their military value.”73 McChrystal put it in
more general terms in his tactical directive: “the carefully controlled
and disciplined employment of force entails risk to our troops – and
we must mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of
force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater
risk.”74 The political and the military become blurred: “A policy
decision only to fight wars with clear military solutions would mean
to decline involvement in several situations in which enemies,
especially non-state actors, refuse to engage in conventional battle
against Western military forces.”75
In 1957, Professor Samuel Huntington wrote The Soldier and
the State, in which he outlined what constituted a professional
Soldier.76 Professor Huntington opined the Soldier’s purpose was
“the management of violence.”77 But the modern Soldier is asked to
do much more. Today’s Soldier is asked to manage governance:
Soldiers build schools, teach judges, manage power plants, grow

Sir Michael Howard, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Apr. 13, 2013)
(reviewing ERNIE SIMPSON,’ WAR FROM THE GROUND UP: TWENTY-FRISTCENTURY COMBAT AS POLITICS (2013 [hereinafter “Simpson”]).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id. at 234.
74 Declassified excerpt from NATO’s Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009,
released by NATO ISAF Headquarters, 6 July 2009.
75 Howard, supra note 70, at 11
76 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE (1957).
77 Id. at 16.
70
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crops.78 Even in non-permissive environments, Soldiers are expected
to mitigate violence. In concept, mitigating violence is attractive, but
in practice, the asymmetric enemy is unlikely to give the Soldier any
indication that he or she is a belligerent.
One example of this thinking is the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Marine Corps manual for counterinsurgency (COIN).79
Understanding the asymmetric reality of both Iraq and Afghanistan,
the military decided in the mid-2000s to redraft the COIN manual. In
particular, the situation in Iraq had deteriorated and the insurgency
was gaining momentum. The manual, published in June 2006,
acknowledged “[a]t its core, counterinsurgency warfare is a struggle
for the support of the population. Their protection and welfare is the
center of gravity for friendly fire.”80 One of the enumerated
‘unsuccessful practices’ in the counterinsurgency manual was the
warning not to place a “priority on killing and capturing the
enemy. . .”81 The goal instead is to engage and protect the population.
Counterinsurgency is an example of the second form of
warfare discussed by Simpson; Counterinsurgency’s core mission is
to make a political reality happen. This means political factors are
primary. In the case of Afghanistan, it was the popular legitimacy of
the government. In the words of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry,
“[b]roadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect
civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure,
and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation
government able to deliver essential human services.”82
The COIN doctrine allows the use of force, to include lethal
force, but the entire narrative of the manual is to constrain the use of
force:

78 Dominic Tierney, Op-Ed., Jefferson’s Army of Nation Builders, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2010.
79 Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication 3-33.5, December 2006 [hereinafter “COIN Manual”], at Preface.
80 Id. at 1.1.
81 Id.
82 Karl W. Eikenberry, The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan:
The Other Side of the COIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 59, 63.
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[a]ny use of force generates a series of
reactions. . . .the type and amount of force to be
applied, and who wields it, should be carefully
calculated by a counterinsurgent for any operation.
An operation that kills five insurgents is
counterproductive if the collateral damage or the
creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of
fifty more. 83
This rationale and logic was clear in the 2011 tactical directive
of the Commander of ISAF, General John R. Allen, which stated:
[c]onsider all use of force carefully. Ensure that the
use of force is necessary and proportionate to the
threat faced, and when applied it is precisely
delivered. We must never forget the center of gravity
in this campaign is the Afghan people; the citizens of
Afghanistan will ultimately determine the future of
their country.84
During the same time frame the COIN concept was being
developed within the Department of Defense, the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enacted a breathtaking change
to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE): individual Soldiers no
longer enjoyed the personal right of self-defense.85 Individual selfdefense became a subset of unit self-defense and exercised by the
unit commander: “unit commanders may limit individual self-defense
by members of their unit.”86 The theoretical foundation of individual
self-defense is premised on three pillars: the force used is necessary;
the amount of force used is proportional; and the threat is imminent.
In the previous editions of the SROE, the U.S. recognized each

COIN Manual, paragraph 1-141
ISAF Tactical Directive, 30 November 2011, found at
http://www.rs.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20tactical%20directive%
20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf.
85 Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of
Engagement, 13 June 2005 at para. E.2.a.
86 Id.
83
84
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Soldier possessed the “inherent right to use all necessary means
available and to take appropriate actions to defend oneself. . . .” 87
The suspension of an individual Soldier’s right of self-defense
and the ascent of the COIN doctrine are inextricably related; the
concept of limiting the use of force is woven throughout the
counterinsurgency manual.88 The suspension and ascent are related by
time, effect, and circumstances on the ground in both Afghanistan
and Iraq in 2004 and 2005. There was a conclusion that military
commanders could not use violence to win the conflict. And the
COIN doctrine, by its very nature, and the suspension of selfdefense, limits the use of force.
The COIN doctrine during an insurgency is not ill-advised;
this doctrine is a legitimate means to execute a war. But the desire to
limit force has a profound effect on a State’s military. The
management of violence by the Soldier under COIN is the exception;
now, under Simpson’s second paradigm, the Soldier is focused on
managing governance. The military activity is no longer clearly
distinguishable from the political activity by the Soldier on behalf of
State. This means we enter a conflict where military violence is
eschewed. Conditions allowing the use of force to be confined and
constrained is, however, a policy decision. Counterinsurgency policy
does not change the law that applies to combatants in conflict. It
does, however, change the public’s mindset of what war constitutes.
The public begins to think we can produce results with limited force.
It then becomes the expectation – especially from the public, via the
press – that any force which results in a death of an innocent is the
exception. It drives the public to believe the resultant damage or
death is the salient factor in considering if a force was justified to
begin with.
In other words, civilian criminal law standards start to apply
to privileged belligerents on the battlefield. Terms like self-defense,
necessity, and proportionality exist both within criminal law and jus in
bello. This leads some to think the jus in bello standards imbedded in
Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of
Engagement, 15 January 2000 at Enclosure A, para. 5.a.
88 COIN Manual, supra note 79.
87
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IHL are the same language: the same concepts and meaning
extrapolated from civilian criminal law. The media, commentators,
and even jurists are guilty of this mistake. The fact is, although the
vocabulary may be similar, the meaning of these terms is tectonically
different. This category of conflation error has recently arisen within
the decisions of the international tribunals.
C. Trend 3: Criminalization of the Use of Force by International
Courts
Military objectives are central to the use of violence by a
military commander. Military objectives are “limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.”89 The sad reality is that civilians,
who are protected by IHL, will inevitably be in areas of armed
conflict and exposed to harm. It is therefore universally recognized,
in the words of Professor Geoffrey Corn, “that the principle of
military objective is insufficient to provide adequate protection for
civilians from the harmful effects of hostilities.”90 With this reality in
mind, military professionals, through customary practice, developed
the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality. These
were recorded by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions Additional
Protocol, which prohibits 1) attacks that are intentionally against
civilians and 2) attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in
relation to the concrete military objective.91
The first prohibition is intent based; the second is a balancing
of military objectives and the civilian casualties and determining if the
latter was excessive. The first violates the principle of distinction,
while the second violates the principle of proportionality. Distinction,
as noted earlier, is the obligation of military personnel to delineate
Additional Protocol I, 52(2).
Expert Report of Professor Geoffrey Corn to the ICTY for the case of
The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT-06-90, at
12.
91 Additional Protocol I, 48 & 51(5)(b).
89
90
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between combatants and civilians. Proportionality is a much more
ambiguous concept because it is subjective; proportionality is
violated, in essence, when it is determined that the harm to civilians
was excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated from attacking a lawful military objective. Professor Jens
David Ohlin of Cornell University concludes, “that there are almost
no examples of [proportionality-based] prosecutions before
international tribunals that might provide guiding precedent on the
nature of proportionality.”92 Professor Ohlin maintains that
proportionality “has so rarely been applied by international tribunals”
because prosecutors “squeeze almost all of the targeting cases into
the first [prong], thus accusing the commander in question of directly
targeting civilians. . . .”93
Outlining a series of cases with the International Tribunal of
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Professor Ohlin concludes the
common law concept of intent—acting with purpose or
knowledge—required under the first prong of intentionally attacking
civilians within the ICTY has morphed to the lower standard of
recklessness. In other words, the court never has to grapple with the
murky world of proportionality found in the second prong. The case
that crystallizes this lower standard is The Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar.94
In Strugar, the defendant, Lieutenant General Strugar, was a
leader in the then Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.95 The Yugoslav
government, in an attempt to hold Yugoslavia together, was
attempting to suppress the Croatian people from breaking away.96 As
part of this suppression, General Strugar shelled areas of Dubrovnik,
Croatia in late 1991.97 These artillery attacks killed several civilians

Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79
at 86 [hereinafter “Ohlin”].
93 Id.
94 Id. citing Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Jan. 31, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf.
[hereinafter
“Strugar”].
95 Id. at 1.
96 Id.
97 Id.
92
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and destroyed many historic buildings.98 The defendant was charged
with murder and the intentional attacks on civilians. He was found
guilty and sentenced to eight years.99 The Trial Chamber held:
. . . where a civilian population is subject to an attack
such as an artillery attack, which results in civilian
deaths, such deaths may appropriately be
characterized as murder, when the perpetrators had
knowledge of the probability that the attack would cause
death.100
The mere probability the attack would cause death is enough
to trigger a charge of an intentional harming of civilians. The concept
of intent—acting with either purpose or knowledge—under Strugar
expanded to recklessness. This lower standard means a commander
who launches an attack where there is a probability civilians might be
injured or killed is violating IHL; in other words, the commander
launching the attack is a war criminal because of mere probability and
the accompanying result that the harm occurred. In war, it would be
hard to fathom a situation where harm might not befall the civilian
population, especially in an age of asymmetric warfare where the
enemy refuses to distinguish himself from the civilian population.
What is occurring is that the law is being driven by the
results, not the intent. War causes death and destruction and some of
those harmed will be civilians. To minimize those losses is of
paramount import, but to make the standard of culpability one of
recklessness subject to an after-the-fact review is to impose an
unrealistic limitation on the military. And conceptually, it flips IHL
on its head. Professor Ohlin states the conceptual underpinnings of
IHL: “envisioning the killing of civilians and coming to some
conclusion as to whether the number of deaths will be proportionate
or not disproportionate – does not violate the principle of
distinction. Simply envisioning the deaths of civilians does not mean
the commander has directed the attack against the civilians.”101 If that
Id.
Id. at 198.
100 Id. at 110.
101 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 113.
98
99
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were the case, no Soldier would be immune from the reality that in
war civilians will be killed and thereby making Soldiers criminally
liable to this reality.
Even the mental element in Article 30 of the Rome Statute of
1998—the Statute that established the International Criminal Court
(ICC)—states “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court [ICC] only in the material elements are
committed with intent and knowledge.”102 A plain reading of Article
30 seems to suggest the defendant must act with purpose or
knowledge to be culpable. In fact, recklessness as a standard to meet
culpability was considered by the drafters of the Rome Statute and
squarely rejected: the mental element of recklessness was banished
from the Statute.103 Put differently, even if an accused foresees the
possibility of his or her act causing death and still persists, regardless of
the possible consequences, the person is not guilty of a war crime
unless the accused had knowledge civilians would be killed and he or
she meant to kill those civilians.
But some judges and commentators cite Article 30 and the
“unless otherwise provided” clause to conclude recklessness is
enough to find culpability. Recklessness, they argue, is a level of
intent that is an acceptable standard under customary international
law and therefore, otherwise provided; that is, it is an acceptable
mental state for war crimes.104 Professor Ohlin notes, however, “it is
not clear how customary international law could provide a basis to
support a lower mental element.”105 This revisionist interpretation of
what Article 30 means is critical because it changes the focus from
what the Soldier thinks will happen to what an objective person
thinks might happen. Those are two starkly different perspectives. The
former is a mental state possessed by the Soldier when he uses force,
while the latter is about the degree of risk the Soldier takes. Any
military mission will have risks that the Soldier’s acts could cause the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (entered into force
July 1, 2002) at Article 30 [hereinafter “Rome Statute”].
103 Id.; Ohlin supra note 92, at 101.
104 Strugar, supra note 94, at 110.
105 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 108.
102
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death of a civilian – if that is the acid test, however, then any mission
will be judged under the first prong of willfully targeting civilians.
Under this analysis, the courts approach a strict liability: the dead
civilian is presumptively a war crime.
The courts’ decisions and even the far better justified opinion
of Professor Ohlin both make the same conflation error; attempting
to use traditional criminal law concepts to explain terms in jus in bello.
Professor Ohlin falls for the trap of using the common law definition
of intentional (including purpose and knowledge) to define the term
within the Protocol and opening this door invites the subsequent step
down to recklessness. This first prong actually has two parts: A) who
or what was targeted, and B) were they or it a legitimate military
target?
Part A is entirely subjective. Who were you targeting?
Combatants are prohibited from conducting indiscriminate attacks.
Instead, each attack must have a specific legitimate military target.
Thus, for the first prong, the standard is that of motivated purpose.
As the then Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
noted, “International humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit
belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military
objectives even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries
will occur.”106 To use any other standard would be to completely
eliminate the principle of proportionality. That principle forces the
attacker to balance the military advantage with the collateral damage,
meaning the attacker has knowledge a civilian target will be damaged
and yet can still strike if the military advantage outweighs the
collateral cost. The crux is who or what did they plan for the
projectile to hit?
For part B, if the target was a valid military target, this part
has not been violated even if the strike (knowingly) killed dozens of
innocent civilians collaterally, though this would probably violate the
second prong of proportionality. More problematic is if the shooter
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, letter concerning the situation in Iraq, Office of
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, February 9, 2006, p. 5, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2006.pdf.
106
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subjectively believed the target to be a valid military target, but in fact
it was not. For example, Captain Kudo shot the two diggers on the
side of the road in Afghanistan believing they were planting a bomb,
but afterwards we determine they were only digging an irrigation
canal. It is in this second prong that a level of intent less than
purpose might be appropriate. On a static battlefield (e.g., trench
warfare) segregated from the civilian population, it might be
justifiable to issue an order to shoot anything moving in the no man’s
land between the trenches since there is little or no chance it is a
civilian and taking the time to verify it is an enemy may place the
Soldier at risk. This would be in contrast to a modern asymmetric
nonlinear global battlefield. Given these opposite poles of possibility
and correlative responsibility, the sliding scales of recklessness or
negligence seem to provide the best vehicle to balance the myriad of
factors and concerns. However, post hoc evaluation of any such
decision must give full credence to the factual situation for that
belligerent: would a reasonable privileged belligerent with the
knowledge, training, time, resources, and experience of the defendant
have believed the target was lawful? Note this does not open the door
to question if the attack was tactically required at that time under this
prong, but only if the belief of the shooter that the target was a
military target was reasonable under the circumstances.
On at least one occasion, the ICTY grappled with the second
prong: attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in relation to
the concrete military objective. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ante
Gotovina, et al.107, Colonel General Ante Gotovina, a Croatian
commander, was indicted for ordering an illegal artillery attack
against four towns—Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac.108 Each
city was in the Croatian Serb break-away region of Krajina. Croatia
launched an offensive—Operation Storm—in 1995 to bring this
region back under Croatian control. The Croatian forces commenced
to put the towns of Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac under
fire.109 The objective of Operation Storm was to expel Serbian forces
from the region. The Croatian forces succeeded under General
The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT06-90 [hereinafter “Gotovina”].
108 Id. at 9.
109 Id. at 601.
107

142

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Maxwell & Meyer

5:1

Gotovina; they seized Knin, the capital of Krajina, on August 5,
1995.110
The Tribunal’s indictment of General Gotovina for violations
of the laws and customs of war hinged on his shelling of the four
towns. The Trial Chamber found General Gotovina guilty of
violating these laws and customs. As one academic concluded,
“Gotovina’s conviction turns on the lawfulness vel non of the
artillery fires against targets in the[se] Krajina towns. . . .”111
The Trial Court’s judgment of Gotovina appears to be
premised on both prongs of liability: the attacks were intentional (i.e.,
deliberately toward civilians), and the attacks were indiscriminate (i.e.,
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated).112 As Major General Walter B.
Huffman, the former Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army,
noted, “the court apparently embraced a hybrid theory of both
deliberate and indiscriminate targeting in violation of Protocol I,
Articles 51(2) and 51(5)(a).113 Under Article 51(2), the first prong—
”civilians [] shall not be the object of attack”—Gotovina “deliberately
targeted civilian areas.”114 Under Article 51(5), the second prong—the
balancing of the military advantage gained to the amount and severity
of civilian casualties —Gotovina’s shelling “constituted an
indiscriminate attack on these towns. . .”115
Both prongs are premised on an inference that shells that
landed more than 200 meters from a known military objective were
deemed unlawful (deliberate or indiscriminate) attacks on civilian

Id.
Walter B. Huffman, Margin of Error: Potential Pitfalls of the Ruling in the
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, 211 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) [hereinafter “Huffman”].
112 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 12; Additional
Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b).
113 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28.
114 Gotovina, supra note 107, at 973
115 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28.
110
111
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areas.116 With little evidentiary support, the Trial Chamber concluded
“a reasonable interpretation of the evidence that those artillery
projectiles which impacted within a distance of 200 meters of
identified artillery targets were deliberately fired at that artillery
target.”117 The court then extrapolated from this norm that any
projectile falling outside the 200-meter range was disproportionate.118
The Trial Chamber’s decree of a 200-meter rule—without
receiving any evidence on this point—is deeply troubling: “the court
had to make broad assumptions, treat the absence of evidence as
evidence of absence, and resolve ambiguities in favor of the
prosecution to be able to apply its 200 meter standard.”119 The logic
in the Gotovina case extends the trend outlined by Professor Olin that
the threshold of liability is lowered, but in this case, it goes to the
second prong. International Tribunals’ attempt to shoehorn all
civilian deaths into an intentional act, even if reckless, under the first
prong (the military commander knew there would be civilians
casualties), is driven by the prosecutor’s theory of the case. Opening
the aperture to recklessness is concerning and fraught with dangers.
In essence, the court’s focus is on the post-hoc effects of the
military’s attack instead of what is required by IHL; that commanders
act in good faith to do all within their capabilities and limitations to
minimize civilian casualties while accomplishing their mission.120 The
Gotovina Court, however, introduces a per se rule into the subjectivity
of proportionality. The court dictates that since the commander
exceeded the 200-meter rule, he is per se excessive under the second
prong.
When triggering a per se rule, an international tribunal never
has to contend with the commander’s intent and examine his goodfaith precautions to spare innocence. Like reducing intentionality to
mere recklessness, the court sidestepped the rigorous balancing
116 Gotovina,
supra
note
107
(Summary
at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110415_summary.pdf).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Huffman, supra note 111, at 36.
120 ICRC Commentary on International Humanitarian Law, note 22 at para.
2215.
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analysis required under the principle of proportionality. Instead, the
Gotovina Court relied on a strict liability of violating some abstract
rule of distance to find liability. To abandon this balancing test is
problematic to say the least.
As General Huffman concludes, “[a] hallmark of international
humanitarian law is its consistency with the actual practice of warfare
by civilized nations.”121 The court’s per se 200-meter rule, made out
of whole cloth, alters the timeframe to be examined; in other words,
the moment in time for consideration is shifted from the time of
attack to the time the collateral damage occurs. This is contrary to
IHL in that the question of whether the commander killed or injured
civilians becomes the locus of judgment instead of examining the
commander’s military necessity at the time of attack. Even the
commentary to the Additional Protocols acknowledges that under the
second prong, when determining if the harm to civilians is excessive
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from an
attack of a lawful military objective, the perspective to be examined is
the military commander’s before the attack.122 It is the prosecution’s
obligation under the customs and laws of war to show there was a
criminal intent by the commander when he ordered the attack. The
destructive results are evidence but nothing in the law requires, nor
should it, the results be the driver. It is the commander’s intent at the
time.
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s
conviction and found the 200-meter rule to be arbitrary; it further
concluded the civilian casualties were not excessive compared to the
military advantage from shelling the four towns. 123 As one military
and artillery expert opined, “I can state unequivocally that a circle of
200 m[eters] around a target could never serve as a realistic or proper

Huffman, supra note 111, at 45.
Commentary to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions at
pp. 683,684.
123 Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Nov.. 16, 2012) at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf at pp.
19-21.
121
122
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standard for a sound assessment of cannon and rocket fire. . . .”124
Although set aside, the Gotovina Trial Court opened the door for
international tribunals to stitch new rules out of whole cloth that
impose criminal liability on commanders. As General Gotovina’s
appeal correctly asserts the judgment “has far-reaching significance
beyond [his] case. . . . The Judgment is an unreasonable and
unrealistic precedent that undermines that credibility and relevance of
[international] humanitarian law. It imposes a standard so exacting
that it renders lawful warfare impossible for military commanders.”125
Professor Corn submitted an expert report before the trial
court and in subsequent writings opined that the Tribunal was left
with differing opinions on the reasonableness of General Gotovina’s
judgment.126 Professor Corn’s concern is that the International
Tribunal seemed to base its reasonableness of Gotovina’s actions on
an assessment of whether a commander considered evidence in
support of his decision. 127 But this should not be the standard in a
criminal proceeding for reasonableness. Instead, the gravamen of the
proceedings should be “on the quality of the evidence that supported
the [commander’s] decision.”128 In a nutshell, Professor Corn makes
the point that, “[i]nstead of focusing on the question of whether the
commander reasonably believed the object of attack was a military
objective, the Tribunal has focused on the question of whether the
commander knew the object of attack was a civilian or civilian
property.”129
The reality is that any criminal judgment of a Soldier using
force will be after the fact—post hoc. The test must be one of
Huffman citing Comments and Conclusions by GenMaj (ret.) Rolf Th.
Ocken, German Army, on the Subject “Croatian Army use of Artillery in KNIN,
CROATIA on 4-5 August 1995,” (Nov. 19, 2011).
125 Notice of Appeal of Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, May 16,
2011, found at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom6/en/110516.pdf at
pp 4-5.
126 Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgement, and a Proposed Quantum of
Information Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77
Brook. L. Rev. 437, 456-457.
127 Id. at 458.
128 Id.
129 Id.
124
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reasonableness, but the analysis should start with what information
did the commander have at the time? Professor Corn was “struck by
the inherent arbitrariness of [the court’s] assessment.”130 Professor
Corn writes, “[w]hile it seemed relatively apparent that the Presiding
Judge was determined to critique the reasonableness of General
Gotovina’s judgments by carefully considering all the facts and
circumstances prevailing at the time, there was never any discussion
of the amount of proof required to render those judgments
reasonable.”131
This lack of standard will inevitably drive a judicial appraisal
to make determinations on what occurred after the fact vice the
considerations and deliberations of the Soldier before the fact. The
real question is: do the military actions have a reasonable basis in
military necessity? The presumption must be yes. To presume
otherwise would lead to the post hoc critiquing of a commander’s
actions based on what occurred, instead of the commander’s intent as
expressed by his orders.
D. Trend 4: Revising Jus in bello Without Considering the Effect on
the Innocent Warfighter
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary
practice. Professional warfighters with battlefield experience have
balanced humanitarian goals with the moral and legal mandate to end
the conflict as quickly as possible and the rights and respect owed the
individual warfighter to create the principles of jus in bello. By
developing through customary practice, these principles were able to
evolve without threatening the military mission or unjustly
victimizing the warfighter. The battlefield is so dissimilar to everyday
life because its denizens operate outside the protections of the law.
The battlefield is not the place for external academic, untested, newidea-driven change. Sadly, this has not dissuaded some from
attempting exactly that.

130
131

Id. at 457.
Id.
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In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) sent a shock wave across the international legal community.
The ICRC published its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law. In this Interpretive Guidance, written by Nils Melzer, the
following recommendation was proposed:
Restraint on the use of force in direct attack
In addition to the restraints imposed by international
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions
that may arise under other applicable branches of
international law, the kind and degree of force which
is permissible against persons not entitled to
protection against direct attack must not exceed what
is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate
military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.132
It was the phrase “must not exceed what is actually
necessary”133 that caused the firestorm. The ICRC recommended a
use-of-force continuum theory, or as some academics refer to it, the
‘least harmful means rule.’ In the Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC
goes on to explain what it meant by necessary:
[i]n sum, while operating forces can hardly be
required to take additional risks for themselves or the
civilian population in order to capture an armed
adversary alive, it would defy basic notions of
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving
him or her an opportunity to surrender where there
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force. 134

ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, adopted February 26, 2009. at
996.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1043.
132
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The footnote substantiating this claim quotes the writings of
Jean Pictet, once the President of the ICRC and the lead editor of the
authoritative commentary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Pictet
opined: “[i]f we can put a Soldier out of action by capturing him, we
should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding
him, we must not kill him. . . .”135
Other academics have also advanced a ‘least harmful means
rule.’ Professor Goodman of New York University used the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance as a springboard to argue a ‘least harmful
means rule,’ “should be understood to have a solid foundation in the
structure, rules, and practices of modern warfare.”136 His argument is
grounded in Article 41(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which
mandates the safeguarding of hors de combat—those combatants
outside the fight. 137 Goodman argues, like the Interpretive Guidance,
“a Soldier who is rendered defenseless or incapable of resistance
should not be subject to attack.”138 He expands the conceptual
definition of hors de combat and argues an enemy combatant should
be treated like a hors de combat when “there is clearly no military
benefit (including any risk to one’s own forces) to be gained from
killing rather than capturing an individual.”139 This includes situations
where the enemy combatant could still physically engage in hostilities
but does not. Like the Interpretive Guidance, Professor Goodman
suggests that considerations of military necessity and humanity
should guide the determination of how to conduct an engagement. 140
His theoretical basis for abandoning the well-entrenched rule that
members of an enemy belligerency qualify as lawful objects of attack
at all times and all places for as long as they remain under the
operational command and control of enemy leadership and are
physically capable of acting on that authority 141 is to limit the scope of
Id. at 1044
Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J.
INT’L .L. 819 (2013) [hereinafter “Goodman”].
137 Id. & Additional Protocol 1, Art. 85(3).
138 Goodman, supra note 136, at 830.
139 Id. at 839.
140 Id.
141 Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen,
Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD.
536, 538 (2013) [hereinafter “Corn et al.”].
135
136
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military necessity.142 In other words, an enemy belligerent who would
do no harm; that is, defenseless, is not militarily necessary to kill.
Other academics echo this conclusion:
[T]he current interpretation of ‘necessary’ as including
what is less costly or less risky or even merely
convenient allows too broad a discretion for forces to
attack available—rather than clearly ‘necessary’—
targets. To bring the term ‘necessary’ closer to its
literal meaning, it should include a least-harmful
means component; it is entirely possible to conceive
of ‘necessary’ as the least measure of harm by which
to achieve a desired end.143
The challenges with the ICRC’s rationale, along with the
scholarship of Professor Goodman, are fourfold. First, there is
absolutely no requirement under state practice or international law,
namely the 1977 Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions, for
a combatant to do a ‘military necessity’ analysis of an enemy
belligerent; the Soldier need not to look to a ‘least harmful means
rule’ as to whether the Soldier should capture the enemy belligerent
or kill him. Given that military necessity “justifies those measures not
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible,”144 killing
an enemy belligerent is per se permissible. The enemy belligerent takes
a status under IHL of being a military target. The rationale is simple:
“military necessity admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies.”145 As noted Law of War expert Hays Parks concluded,
“[t]here is no ‘military necessity’ determination requirement for an
individual Soldier to engage an enemy combatant or a civilian

Goodman, supra note 136, at 830.
Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115,
161 (2011).
144 See Note 25.
145 W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study:
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 804
(2010) [hereinafter “Parks”].
142
143
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determined to be taking a direct part in hostilities, any more than
there is for a Soldier to attack an enemy tank.”146
The second challenge is one of shifting burdens. Under
current international law, the burden is on the enemy belligerent to
indicate his surrender affirmatively. This assumes the enemy
belligerent is not a hors de combat—”rendered unconscious or is
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is
incapable of defending himself.”147 Professor Michael Schmitt of the
Naval War College makes the point, “[a] rule that prohibits an attack
whenever the individual can be captured would shift the burden from
the fighter to the attacker in a way that warfighting states would have
been, and remain, unlikely to countenance.”148 These States would
not adhere to such a shift in burden because it would add a layer of
complexity to military operations—training, implementation,
accountability—that is simply unsustainable. The reality is, “the
historic consequence of combat is that combatants lawfully may kill
their enemies and are at constant risk of being killed by them.”149
Related to the shifting burden States would eschew, the third
troubling point about the ICRC’s proposal is its lack of practicality.
In the words of Professors Geoffrey Corn, Laurie Blank, Chris Jenks,
and Eric Talbot Jensen:
once the law requires that Soldiers assess the actual
threat an enemy combatant poses, the inevitable
consequence of a rule that requires less harmful
means based on the absence of an actual threat, the
effectiveness of combat capability risks dilution, and
tactical clarity will be degraded. . . . [and] [d]iluting
tactical clarity will inevitably dilute . . . moral clarity.150

Id.
Additional Protocol 1, Art. 41.
148 Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s
‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L .L. 855, 858 (2013).
149 Parks, supra note 145, at 829.
150 Corn et al., supra note 141, at 567-568.
146
147
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Once the element of subjectivity enters the equation, moral
clarity—whether it is at the tactical, operational, or strategic level—
exits. Professors Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen make a compelling
case that not giving the Soldier the clarity of whether he can engage
and shoot an enemy belligerent will result in hesitation, confusion, or
create a chilling effect on what the Soldier is asked to do: engage with
and destroy the enemy. The second-guessing with the benefit of
20/20 hindsight will cripple a Soldier’s certainty that when he
engages with the enemy, his mission, as has been the mission of
Soldiers for centuries before him, is to kill the enemy. And “the
assurance and knowledge that the always difficult decision to take
another human life was legally and operationally justified. . . .”151 is
critical to a Soldier’s mental and moral compass. The authors of this
article go one step further: the ‘least harmful means rule’ would
eviscerate moral clarity in the fog of war.
The fourth concern is that the ‘least harmful means rule’ is
actually the conflation of two legal regimes: IHL and domestic law
norms outlined within human rights law (HRL). Under HRL, known
as the law enforcement regime, the use of lethal force is one of last
resort. When a law enforcement officer has reasonable alternatives,
he or she must exercise them. The criminal suspect in a domestic
context never takes a status of a military target; in laymen’s speak, the
criminal cannot be killed merely because of what he is suspected of
having done criminally. The compact in the law enforcement
paradigm is “to protect individuals from abuse by their State”152 of
which the suspect is a member. And when lethal force is used in the
domestic setting, it must be necessary, proportional, and imminent;
that is, the officer triggers a right of self-defense for himself or others
in the vicinity.
In the U.S. context, the Supreme Court has held that the use
of deadly force is reasonable under the Constitution and therefore
authorized when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect
Id. at 620.
ICRC, The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay between the
Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms at 7, found at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf [hereinafter
“Interplay”].
151
152
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is dangerous and can escape and a verbal warning, if feasible, is
given.153 On the other side of the equation, the Court has held that
“[w]here a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”154 It is the
criminal’s conduct that will drive the actions of the police officer.
The moral compact of the officer with the society they serve is the
basis for their authority: “human rights law regulates the resort to
force by State authorities in order to maintain or restore public
security, law and order.”155 Minimum force or a ‘least harmful means
rule’ in this context makes sense—lethal force is a measure of last
resort because of what the police officer is entrusted to accomplish.
This is not the logic behind IHL. The driving force behind
IHL is not to ensure public security, although that could be one the
military’s tasks; the main goal is to set parameters for Soldiers as
agents of the State on how to destroy the enemy. The cardinal rule of
the combatant is distinction—”parties to an armed conflict must at
all times distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one
hand, and combatants and military objectives on the other hand and
direct their attacks only against the latter.”156 Given this limitation on
the use of force, the Soldier, as an agent of the State, is told by the
State how to accomplish the goal of destroying the combatants and
military objectives. The use of force to accomplish the mission is
driven by the State. This collective action by the State uses the Soldier
to effectuate this goal because the State tells the Soldier what are the
policy limits of ‘military necessity’ to accomplish the mission. The
role and purpose of the police officer is fundamentally different, and
it is why the law enforcement paradigm is troubling in an armed
conflict scenario.

153
154
155
156

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
Id.
Interplay, supra note 152, at 7.
See note 33.
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E. Trend 5: Challenging the Use of Force by the Military in Civil
Courts that Lack Subject Matter Competence
Scholars and international organizations that would make it
more difficult for Soldiers to engage the enemy are but one prong of
the trend against the use of military force. The other prongs stem
from the legal profession: one of those prongs is the access litigants
have to the courtroom to challenge decisions made by military
personnel. The civil litigation exposure prong is best evidenced by a
string of recent cases emerging from the United Kingdom.
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), drafted in 1950, states signatories “shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . this
Convention.”157 The Convention, in its first substantive article,
Article 2, outlines a central pillar of human rights law: the right to
life.158 The Convention mandates that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall
be protected by law.”159 It does, however, give its signatories a caveat:
“[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force
which is not more than absolutely necessary. . . .”160 To judicially
enforce these rights and freedoms, the convention established a
court: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).161 This court,
which virtually all European countries have ratified, to include the
UK, can and has trumped the rulings of domestic courts.
The real battle line of when States have violated one’s right to
life has been the elasticity of the concept of jurisdiction; in other
words, does the right to life provision contained in Article 2—or any
other provision within the Convention, for that matter—have
extraterritorial application outside Europe? Of particular import is
whether this human rights norm applies to conflict areas like
Afghanistan and Iraq. In late 2001, the case of Bankovic et al. v. Belgium
et al was brought before the ECtHR by six citizens from the Federal
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Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights (2010).
Id. at Article 2.
Id. at Art. 2(1).
Id. at Art. 2(2).
Id. at Art. 19-51.
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Republic of Yugoslavia against 17 European members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).162 The claim flowed from
NATO’s Operation Allied Force. This operation was an air campaign
directed at Yugoslavia in an effort to force Yugoslavia to remove its
forces from Kosovo.163 In the morning raid of April 23, 1999, NATO
bombs killed and injured scores of Yugoslavians.164 The claimants,
whose relatives died, alleged a violation of the right to life under
Article 2.165 The question for the ECtHR was whether there was
jurisdiction to allow the case to go forward. The ECtHR said
individuals killed by missiles or bombs fired from an aircraft outside
an area under the effective control of a State were not within the
State’s jurisdiction.166
The defendants in the Bankovic Case, the 17 NATO States,
argued that the term “jurisdiction” meant an “assertion or exercise of
legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form
of allegiance to that State or who have been brought within that
State’s control.”167 The ECtHR seemed to agree. It proclaimed that
“the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial.”168
The Court went on to articulate that “Article 1 of the Convention
must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial
notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional
and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of
each case.”169 If extra-territorial jurisdiction was to exist, then the
State must militarily occupy or exercise all or some of the public
powers normally to be exercised by that territory’s government.170

Bankovic, Stojanovic, Stoimedovski, Joksimovic and Sukovic v. Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at 41 I.L.M.
517 [hereinafter “Bankovic v. Belgium”].
163 Id. at pp 518-519.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 522.
166 Id. at pp. 523-524.
167 Id. at 522.
168 Id. at 526.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 528.
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In other words, a fair reading of Bankovic is that the
Convention’s extraterritorial jurisdiction must be exceptional.
Professor Marko Milanovic of the University of Nottingham,
however, traces the ECtHR’s slow abandonment of this norm. 171 In
2007, for example, the ECtHR in Pad and others v. Turkey found
jurisdiction when an Iranian family living near the Turkish-Iranian
border was killed by a missile.172 It was disputed where the attack
occurred but “the Court clearly thought that it would have been
entirely arbitrary for the application of the [European Court of
Human Rights] to hinge on the applicants’ location within a few
hundred metres.”173
Ten years after Bankovic, the ECtHR heard the case of AlSkeini v. United Kingdom.174 In Al-Skeini, six Iraqis brought suit against
the United Kingdom. The six claimants asserted the British failed to
conduct a full and thorough investigation into the deaths of their
family members; this, they maintained, was a procedural violation of
Article 2, the right to life.175 Five of the dead Iraqis died in fire fights
with the British troops. According to the British Government, British
troops were patrolling the streets of Basra one evening in August
2003 when they heard gunfire. As the Soldiers approached the
gunfire, the patrol leader saw several Iraqi men, including Mr. AlSkeini, with weapons; one of the Iraqi men pointed his weapon at
him and his unit. In self-defense, the British Soldier shot and killed
the Iraqi men. A subsequent investigation found that the Soldiers’
actions were a valid exercise of self-defense.176 The Iraqi testimony is
starkly different: the British Soldiers killed the Iraqis without
provocation and the reason one of the deceased Iraqis had a weapon
was because he was walking to a funeral and discharge of weapons at

171 Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L
.L. 121 (2012) [hereinafter “Milanovic Al-Skeini”].
172 Id. at 124.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 121.
175 Id. at 125.
176 ECtHR, Al-Skeini et al. v. UK, App. No. 55721/07,7, 7 July 2011 at para.
34-62.
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funerals is common.177 In other words, the Iraqis maintained that
those killed never threatened the British Soldiers.
The sixth claimant in Al-Skeini drew the most scrutiny. Like
the other claimants, Mr. Baha Mousa’s father, on behalf of his son,
claimed that there had been an inadequate investigation. For Mr.
Mousa, however, is was for the asphyxiation death of Mr. Mousa in a
British detainment facility in Basra.178
The British House of Lords dismissed the claims of the five
Iraqis involved in the firefight.179 The majority applied an “effective
control” test. The United Kingdom never exercised effective control
over Basra, even though the British were an occupying power in
Basra and southern Iraq. The insurgency and the limited number of
British troops made effective control in Basra not possible. The Law
Lords cited Bankovic for the notion that the mere killing of an
individual does not trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction.180 The House
of Lords did find jurisdiction regarding the death of Baha Mousa, but
on the grounds that a British prison was like an embassy and
jurisdiction attached.181
The question before the ECtHR was what does “within their
jurisdiction” mean: when and where do the obligations outlined in
the ECHR—specifically the right to life under Article 2—apply? The
ECtHR, in essence, expanded Bankovic and opened the jurisdictional
aperture as follows:
. . . following the removal from power of the Ba’ath
regime and under the accession of the Interim
Government, the United Kingdom (together with the
United States) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some
of the public power normally to be exercised by a
sovereign government. In particular, the United
Id.
Id. at paras. 63-71.
179 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for
Defense (2007) UKHL (2008) AC 153.
180 Id. at para. 83.
181 Id. at paras. 97 & 132.
177
178
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Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the
maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these
exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that
the United Kingdom, through its Soldiers engaged in
security operations in Basrah during the period in
question, exercised authority and control over
individuals killed in the course of such security
operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link
between the deceased and the United Kingdom for
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention. 182
This holding is extraordinarily expansive and can be read to
mean that when there are boots-on-the-ground Soldiers conducting
security operations, the reach of the ECTHR will extend to that
battlefield. Every army has “public power.” One principle mission of
a Soldier is to engage in security operations, especially in light of
COIN operations. The Al-Skeini Case extends jurisdiction, allowing
individual claimants to challenge the conduct of how the military
conducts its operations. This ability to second-guess a military’s
operations will have profound impact on how a nation’s military
conducts its operations worldwide. But there are second and third
order effects, as well. The United Kingdom felt the brunt of Al-Skeini
in two ways: one tactical and one strategic. The claims were allowed
to go forward, costing the British Government a handsome sum of
money. But more fundamentally, it opened the floodgate of claimants
that would challenge how the British Army does business on the
battlefield. This second point was acutely realized with the case of
Smith (No. 2) v. The Ministry of Defence.183
The facts of Smith are chilling both factually and legally—in
large measure because the claimants are members of the British
military.184 The claimants alleged a violation of Article 2—right to life.
They claimed the equipment they were provided while deployed to
Iraq was not suitable.185 On 15 July 2005, a British squad-sized unit
Note 171 at paras. 143-148.
R (on the application of Smith and others) v. Secretary of State for
Defense (2013) UKSC 41.
184 Id.
185 Id. at paras. 9-12.
182
183
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patrolled Al Amarah in Iraq. The vehicle used by the patrol was a
“Snatch Land Rover.” This vehicle had not been fitted with an
electronic countermeasure to protect it from improvised explosive
devises, known as IEDs. While on patrol, the Snatch Land Rover hit
an IED; three Soldiers died and two were injured. Seven months
later, in the same town, another Snatch Land Rover hit an IED and
two more Soldiers lost their lives. The second vehicle had been
outfitted with an electronic countermeasure, but there was a part
missing to the system and therefore it did not work.186
The families of the fallen Soldiers sued Her Majesty’s
Government, asserting that the Ministry of Defence breached the
right to life under the ECtHR because the government neglected its
duty for care. The government’s legal defense centered on combat
immunity.187 This legal concept, developed through case law, stands
for the proposition that “while the armed forces are in the course of
actually operating against the enemy, they are under no ‘actionable’
duty of care as defined by common law to avoid causing loss or
damage to their fellow Soldiers, or indeed to anyone who may be
affected by what they do.”188
The UK Supreme Court did not agree. The salient issue
before the Court was whether the European Convention on Human
Rights applies extraterritorially to protect British troops abroad, to
include in combat areas of operation like Iraq.189 The Court had
already answered this question in the negative. But in light of the
ECtHR ruling in Al-Skeini, the British High Court reversed itself and
made a marked departure from its precedence. The Court, in a 4-to-3
decision, allowed the claim to proceed under Article 2 of the ECtHR
as its basis. The majority opinion, written by Lord Hope, took great
efforts to make its legal trepidations known:
[the battlefield] is a field of human activity which the
law should enter into with great caution . . . [i]t risks
undermining the ability of a state to defend itself, or
186
187
188
189

Id.
Id. at para.13.
Tugendhat, supra note 26, at 31.
Supra note 178.
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its interest, at home or abroad. The world is a
dangerous place, and states cannot disable themselves
from meeting its challenges. Ultimately democracy
itself may be at risk.190
The Court, however, held that the claims may go forward and
granted jurisdiction to the families of the fallen Soldiers to pursue
their Article 2 claims. The Court found jurisdiction under these facts,
but it limited jurisdiction “in connection with the planning for and
conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which
are unrealistic or disproportionate.”191 In other words, the egregious
facts of this case drove the result. This ‘middle ground,’ a word
choice of Lord Hope,192 was a direct extension of the expansive
scope of Al-Skeini.
Lord Hope’s sentiment that “operations conducted in the
face of the enemy are inherently unpredictable”193 is a truism. This
judgment allows individuals, Soldiers in this case, to question and
challenge the decisions of the military’s leadership. The middle
ground is no ground at all. The reality must be clear: legal mission
creep will occur. The law and its profession is a product of examining
events after the fact—ex post facto. The profession of arms and the
law that supports it under IHL are not; International Humanitarian
Law is a product of using judgment before force is used. This is why
Soldiers train and prepare for conflict knowing the moment they see
conflict, all plans will morph once there is contact with the enemy. As
Lord Hope acknowledges:
[t]hings tend to look and feel very different on the
battlefield from the way they look on such charts and
images as those behind the lines may have available to
them. A court should be very slow indeed to question

190
191
192
193

Id. at para. 66.
Id. at para. 76.
Id.
Id. at para. 64.
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operational decisions made on the ground by
commanders, whatever their rank or level seniority.194
However, the door has been opened and with it, an inevitable
breed of military officer who is hesitant and timid. War is foggy and
unpredictable. If courts, through litigants, are allowed to secondguess military decisions that ultimately lead men and women to their
deaths, then conservatism and restraint will descend upon military
decisions. Both concepts are and should be an anathema to the
warrior ethos.
IV.

CONCLUSION

International Humanitarian Law was created so that Soldiers
did not bear the responsibility of the actions of the public; it allows
the Soldier to commit acts on behalf of the State that would be illegal
otherwise. When we narrow what the Soldier can do, we eliminate
their ability to effectuate the end of the war. The five trends
discussed, if brought to fruition and taken collectively, suffocate the
Soldier. They leave a Soldier virtually helpless. The advantage goes to
the actor who fails to follow the rules and is asymmetric in his
infliction of violence. Instead of probing how to hold the hostile
civilian accountable, the trend is to impose rules on the lawful
combatant that mirror what would be imposed on a police officer.
The trend is pushing jurisprudence in the wrong direction. The
asymmetric fighter will not change tactics, and, in fact, limiting the
Soldier will embolden these fighters. Giving such a profound
advantage to the enemy, limits a Soldier’s ability to determine what is
militarily necessary and in the process, prolongs the war and prolongs
the Soldiers’ exposure to harm.
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary
practice by countless military professionals. Its core principles of
distinction, military necessity, and proportionality provide the proper
balance between mission and humanity in an armed conflict. They are
entirely separate and morally and legally distinct from the concept of
194
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jus ad bellum. If properly applied, they protect the warfighter from the
blending of the management of governance and the management of
violence. They do not require supplement by the very dissimilar
jurisprudence of traditional criminal law to properly analyze actions
on the battlefield. They continually evolve, but in a careful, deliberate
manner as the cost of error is too great for not only the warfighter
but also the community of international States. However, because the
principles are concepts rooted in the totally unique human
experience, they should only be adjudicated by courts with a level of
military competence and experience, not any criminal court that
extends its jurisdiction in order to make a public statement about a
given conflict.
Returning to our two incidents from the introduction – one
in South Carolina, one in Afghanistan -- the rules that govern the two
are profoundly different. In armed conflict, the three core principles
of jus in bello in the Just War Theory are effective in analyzing the
legality of Captain Kudo’s decision; these principles are simply
irrelevant for judging Officer Groubert’s actions. For Captain Kudo’s
scenario, his subjective belief was that the two diggers were either
Taliban or civilians directly engaged in armed conflict because they
were actively planting an IED in the road. If the belief is true, they
are lawful military targets and the attack would also comply with
military necessity and proportionality since there is no evidence of
any collateral damage to civilians. Even if it turns that Captain Kudo
was incorrect and the diggers were civilian farmers, the attack would
still be lawful if his belief was objectively reasonable when viewed
through the eyes of a professional warfighter in a same or similar
situation.
In armed conflict, unlike the law enforcement situation in
South Carolina, when the attacks are done by members of uniformed
military as part of an armed conflict, privileged belligerency would
apply to those acts. Those privileged belligerents are authorized by
the principle of military necessity to make attacks based on the status
of the targeted victim as a military target. As members of a force
engaged in armed conflict with the coalition, the diggers would
qualify as lawful military targets. The elimination of enemy forces is
an integral part of the mandate from military necessity to secure “the
162
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complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible”195 and
thereby end the conflict. Therefore, an attack would turn on a
question of proportionality: did the concrete military advantage
exceed the collateral cost in terms of damage to civilian lives and
property? However, it is important to limit the proportionality
analysis to the facts known by the attackers at the time of the attack.
Any post hoc judgment based upon the results of the attack is unjust.
The principle of proportionality is based upon the expected concrete
military advantage gained and the expected collateral damage, not the
result. Even if the attackers knew that civilians would die in the
attack, the attack would still be lawful if the expected military
advantage outweighed the expected collateral damage to civilians.
These protection under IHL have no relevancy for Officer
Groubert; his situation requires a self-defense analysis under
common criminal law. Captain Kudo’s situation is not nor should it
be subject to the same analysis.
War is arguably the evilest practice of mankind and all of
humanity should work to prevent any and all future wars. Until that
day arrives, however, we must be careful to preserve and enforce all
three goals of jus in bello. The goals of bringing about a rapid end to
the conflict and limiting the cost to the belligerents are every bit as
important as the goal of avoiding civilian deaths and property
damage.

See GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 277 (2010) (citing U.S.
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956)
para. 3. a. at 4).
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